



There is now a truism, almost universally acknowledged, that the global 
COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing inequities, fissures, and prejudices. 
The communities that have suffered the most—with higher hospitalization and 
mortality rates, higher economic devastation, and starker marginalization—
are communities with existing comorbidities, to displace a clinical term from 
the physical body to the body-politic. While one can study the ways in which a 
virus, invisible to the naked eye and suspended in droplets of breath, is able to 
hover, pass, and transform our world with remarkable alacrity through its own 
epidemiological will, such an examination would only tell us about the virus and 
nothing about us. We, the reluctant hosts, can only be known by the world we have 
built long before this particular virus came into existence. 
Early in April 2020, a WhatsApp forward arrived on my phone (Figure 1 on 
next page).1 It was a cartoon image showing two personified viral bodies, one in 
red (and with a Chinese flag imprinted on it) and one in green (with a topi). The 
bodies were shaking hands. Clasped in their grip was a small person carrying a 
placard—“India.” The caption, “Coronavirus Deal,” marked the “Chinese virus” 
as the “Producer” and the “Jamaati virus” as the “Distributor.”2 The latter had an 
airline tag affixed to his bag—“Tablighi Jamaat.”
Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a lockdown in India on March 
24, 2020. That same evening, the Uttar Pradesh chief minister, Yogi Adityanath, 
attended a Ram Navami event in Ayodhya defying the ban on gatherings.3 Yet by 
March 31, viral videos began to circulate, online and on WhatsApp, of members 
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of Tablighi Jamaat—a global proselytization social network that preaches to 
communities of Muslims—who had held a big gathering in Nizamuddin, New 
Delhi, in early March. The Tablighi Jamaat were accused of having flown in from 
around the world and brought with them the novel coronovirus.4 Within a week, 
scores of Muslims were beaten up on suspicions of being Tablighi.5 On social 
media, a viral hashtag, “#CoronaJihad,” circulated videos of beatdowns, burnings, 
and lynchings targeting Muslims.6 The tag was inspired by, and reminiscent of, 
the previous campaign of “#loveJihad,” which was meant to promote Hindu men 
to marry Muslim women and convert them out of Islam and to prevent Hindu 
women from marrying Muslim men and converting to Islam.7
The Indian media carried breathless news about the “Tablighi” Muslims being 
everywhere—breaking quarantine in the deep south (Tamil Nadu), in Bengal, in 
Karnataka. There were news items about the traveling and living standards of 
Tablighi men and how their idea of communal travel was naturally and necessarily 
prone to the spread of diseases. These unmoderated rumors and video shares 
on WhatsApp had officially “gone viral.” By August 2020, the Indian Journalism 
Review would conclude that the media’s coverage of Tablighi Jamaat was “one of 
the more egregious examples of a majoritarian media that has lost its moral, social 
and professional moorings.”8 The damage, however, was long done.
The Indian media did not invent what was broadly labeled as the “Mussalmani 
virus” in April 2020.9 There was a pandemic in India long before. Evidence, from 
Figure 1
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news reports, viral videos, and testimonials, abounds for documenting pure 
random violence against Muslims and corresponding legal and political shifts 
in the standing of the Muslim citizen in contemporary India. In Gokalpuri, 
northeast Delhi, for example, Musharraf was one Muslim who was dragged from 
his bedroom and lynched in early March 2020.10 Forty-three Muslims were killed 
in Delhi just in early March 2020. Musharraf ’s lynching was a result of widespread 
protests in Delhi against the Indian Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which 
was passed in December 2019.
But before that, on November 9, 2019, the Indian Supreme Court gave a 
unanimous (and unsigned) verdict granting the right to build a Ram Temple at the 
site of the violent demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in 1992. And even 
before November came August 2019, when Pehlu Khan was killed by a Hindu 
mob. And before that, June 2019, when Tabriz Ansari, another Muslim, died at 
the hands of Hindu lynchers.11 The list is tragically endless. While I do not do so 
here, the names of those whose lives and humanity have been violently wrenched 
from them at the hands of Hindus chanting “Jai Shri Ram” must someday be read 
as testimony into the record. 
To be a Muslim in India today is to be a problem. The Muslim is a theological 
problem, a social problem, a cultural problem, and critically, a geopolitical 
problem. The geopolitical name of the Indian Muslim’s problem is Kashmir in 
the northwest, Pakistan in the west, and Bangladesh in the northeast. On August 
5, 2019, India began a military siege of Kashmir, the only majority-Muslim state 
in the nation. Hundreds of Muslims have been blinded by pellet blasts to the face, 
disappeared, imprisoned without due process, and kept without access to the 
Internet or hospitalization by the Indian troops.12 The Kashmiris who have dared 
to ask for their right to speech, to free assembly, or to peaceful protest are labeled 
as terrorists or Pakistani terrorists. 
The December 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act goes along with a National 
Register of Citizens (NRC), which requires Indian citizens in Assam to produce 
documents of ancestry to be enlisted as Indian citizens. The NRC began at the 
Indian border with Bangladesh, where thousands of displaced Rohingya refugees 
have sought asylum and shelter since 2016. India wishes to expel them as 
“Bangladeshi.”13 It is meant to be rolled out to the rest of the country and expel 
“all illegal infiltrators from India.” Muslims in India are imagined to possess a 
foreignness that is innate to their religion. Hindutva depicts Islam, with its holy city 
in Mecca and its holy language of Arabic and its holy text, the Quran, as always-
already outside of the domain of India, despite deep and long histories of Muslim 
presence in the subcontinent documented by communities and scholars alike. In 
the rhetoric of Hindu majoritarianism, the Muslim faith make Muslims foreigners 
to India, and that fact organizes their language, their affiliation, their loyalty. This 
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foreignness has clung to the Muslim body in India since it was first put into words 
by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (who coined the concept of “Hindutva”) in 1923: 
In the case of some of our Mohammaden or Christian countrymen who 
had originally been forcibly converted to a non-Hindu religion who 
consequently have inherited along with Hindus a common Fatherland 
and a greater part of the wealth of common culture are not and cannot be 
recognized as Hindus. For though Hindusthan to them is Fatherland as 
to any other Hindu yet it is not to them a Holyland too. Their Holyland 
is far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen, ideas and 
heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their names and 
their outlook smack of a foreign origin. Their love is divided.14
Savarkar is widely understood to be the leading ideologue of the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindutva militant organization behind Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi (a member since his adolescence). In Savarkar’s vision, 
Muslims in India are not of the place, nor could they ever be. Understood as always 
outside, Muslims are an invasion, an infiltration to be managed, a “deep-seated 
disease” as Savarkar expressed in 1937.15 
Such a potted history as the one I briefly tell here represents only a fraction of 
the known acts of violence in the last year. A year is brief in the chronicles of the 
lynching of Muslims in India since its independence. Just between 2015 and 2018, 
forty-four Muslims were murdered because of accusations of eating beef or other 
transgressions. In today’s India, the Mussalman is a virus, the intruder into the 
body-politic of India. Nowhere is the language of virulence more insidious than 
in Hindutva ideologies of the dangers of Muslim consumption and sexuality, of 
what Muslims do with their bodies. Men were lynched on suspicions that they had 
sought to “capture” Hindu women in acts of sexual violence and “love jihad,” an 
idea of the disease of sexual danger spread by Muslim men who brainwash Hindu 
girls and women. Muslim men were lynched for having “786” tattooed on their 
wrist.16 For both the Hindu right-wing lynching mob and the complicit middle-
class Hindus who look away, the danger and foreignness of Muslims justifies their 
exclusion and death. 
The institutionalization of Muslim exclusion was made into national policy 
in December 2019, when India asked its Muslims to legally prove their status of 
belonging with a fantastical system of documentation that would be impossible 
for virtually any citizen to obtain, let alone preserve. Yet, Muslims of India have 
been presumed to be Pakistani since, well, before Pakistan itself existed. The new 
law created a structure for the systematic denial of citizenship to people and 
communities who had been promised rights at the dawn of the postcolonial nation. 
This denial of belonging was nothing new. The pogroms of 2002 in Gujarat were 
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aimed at wiping out Muslims, deemed aggressors and foreign to the place. Before 
2002, there were the 1992 riots, when thousands tore down the sixteenth-century 
Babri mosque in Ayodhya as a claim for the birthplace of the god Ram. Before that 
were the wars of 1971, 1965, and 1948 with Pakistan. And before that, the gaping 
wound of Partition of 1947, upon which a broken idea of India was built.
On August 5, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic in India exploded after 
months of lockdown, Prime Minister Modi landed in Ayodhya to lay the 
foundation stone for the new temple of Ram to be constructed at the demolished 
site of the Babri mosque. The building of Ram’s temple was made possible by 
the unanimous Supreme Court decision that granted a material historicity to a 
god’s supposed birthplace. In this vision, Ram Mandir will become a great site for 
pilgrims, students, tourists, and proud Indians. “The wait of centuries has ended 
and India is creating a golden chapter in Ayodhya,” Modi proclaimed just as he 
laid the founding brick of the new temple with the legend “Jai Shri Ram” on it.17 
The centuries may be an allusion to an imagined time when a temple stood at 
this site in Ayodhya before being demolished. Or it could be a time before the 
so-called iconoclastic Muslims arrived in the subcontinent. In the language of the 
RSS, the BJP, and Modi himself, the time of Ram was one that was free, golden, 
and unencumbered by Muslim foreign invaders. As thousands of Indians died 
due to pandemic mismanagement and the forced displacement of migrants, Modi 
triumphantly declared the start of a new golden era.
Modi’s invocation of the coming golden age deserves attention, for it is also 
linked to the idea of the Mussalmani virus and to a long history of the invocation 
of a golden age to imagine Indian pasts free of Muslims. Perhaps the most powerful 
invention of a “golden age” happened through the modern remaking of Ashoka and 
his golden age of rule. Through the invocation of Ashoka, colonial historiography 
divided the subcontinental past into Ancient India, Hindustan, and British India. 
Hindustan, which was for hundreds of years a name for all of the subcontinent, 
became, was under colonial rule, simply a label for Muslim despotism, depravity, 
and conquest. For the colonial state, it was important that the British in India 
be seen as redressing the violence of Muslim rulers of Hindustan. Thus, Lord 
Edward Law Ellenborough, in 1842, would bring back the “gates of Somnath” from 
Kabul to “avenge the insult of 800 years,” such that they, “so long the memorial of 
your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory.”18 The 
gates were understood by Ellenborough to have been ripped from the temple of 
Somnath in Gujarat by Mahmud Ghazni and taken to Kabul in the early eleventh 
century. The gates, wrenched from Mahmud’s tomb, ended up being shown to have 
no relationship whatsoever to Somnath, but the intent of restoring the dignity of 
Hindus has remained a potent call till today.
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In the colonial imagination, destruction of Somnath was the one act that 
defined the end of the of golden age of India. Hence, it was Somnath that was 
the center of Savarkar’s vision for a Hindu nation’s rehabilitation. It was Somnath 
that was rebuilt at the impetus of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the first Deputy Prime 
Minister of independent India, and by the efforts of Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi. 
As Munshi described, in 1951, “We would never genuinely feel that freedom had 
come, nor develop faith in our future, unless Somanatha was restored.”19 It was 
Somnath that would be the starting point for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) led procession (Ram Rath Yatra) that would 
end with the destruction of Babri mosque in 1992.20
The Ram Mandir, like Somnath before it, represents a vision of a future. It is 
a homogenizing vision that argues for a singularly devoted India, one that finally 
rids itself of the dark period, and people, who came to inhabit it after its golden 
age. A vision straight out of the founding moment of India, it hopes to give a 
Ka’aba inside India for Indian Hindus. The Mussalman can be imprisoned in open 
air, like in Kashmir. The Mussalman can be cordoned off in borderland camps, 
like in Assam. The Mussalman can be asked to proclaim “Jai Shree Ram,” hide his 
faith, or be erased by violence. What the Mussalman cannot do is be a Mussalman 
in India. The Mussalman of India, long considered an outsider, now imagined as a 
dangerous and deadly virus from afar, has no rhetorical or literal place.
In early 2017, a YouTube video went viral. It was a recording of a performance 
of the poem “Hindustani Musalman” (“Indian Muslim”) by its author, Hussain 
Haidry:
What type of Muslim am I? / I am a Hindustani Muslim / from Deccan, 
from U.P / Bhopal and Delhi / from Kashmir, from Gujarat / of every 
high and low caste / a surgeon, a cobbler, a weaver, a tailor / I contain 
the shlokas of Gita / I have Urdu newspapers / I have a holy month of 
Ramadan / I have dipped myself in the holy Ganga.
Haidry’s verses—unapologetic, funny, and moving—would propel him to 
wide social attention. He was signed up to script a Bollywood film. Yet, by July 
2020, Haidry would become a target of BJP and Hindutva trolls as an “Islamist” and 
“Hinduphobic.” Haidry would suspend his social media accounts under a barrage 
of public abuse and harassment. The fate of his movie, and his own fate, remains 
to be seen. Haidry, a middle-class Muslim born and raised in Maharashtra, who 
had proclaimed his claim to the shlokas of Gita and the holy water of the Ganga, 
is now nothing but a violent terrorist, an anti-nationalist, and an outsider to India.
Haidry became a public figure protesting the Citizenship Amendment Act. The 
anti-CAA protests led to an “occupation” in Shaheen Bagh, Delhi, led by Muslim 
women. The women demanded protection from the state’s claim to question 
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their birthright to India. Haidry and his poem were critical for those protesting. 
The women of Delhi became the target of Hindu violence. Yet, remarkably, over 
weeks in December, January, and February, in bitter cold, they held their ground.21 
They cared for each other, sat together, fed children, sang songs, created a library 
for public use. Dalits and Muslims aligned themselves to protest the caste and 
sectarian violence that they too faced on a daily basis. Their signs, their songs, and 
their chants proclaimed over and over: “We are Indian.” In Shaheen Bagh, in the 
innovations and defiance of women’s organizing, we see the most direct and vivid 
critique of what is now centuries of rhetoric that cast the Muslim as always outside 
of India. 
The declaration, and condition, of the Muslim women in Delhi that they did 
belong, of “Hum Hindustani” (“We, the Indians”), echoes the plight of the Black 
intellectual during the Jim Crow era in the United States. It reminds one of Paul 
Robeson. Robeson was a lawyer, athlete, singer, and scholar of decolonization and 
third-world solidarity. Robeson’s father, William Drew Robeson, was a minister 
and a previously enslaved human being who had escaped his enslavement in 
North Carolina. Robeson studied, worked, performed, and gained national 
acclaim during the era of Jim Crow segregation, but the sin for which his passport 
was taken, and the crime for which he was denied an income for nearly a decade, 
was his contamination with Communism. To white Americans, Robeson was no 
longer “American.”
On June 1956, Paul Robeson was interrogated in the US Congress by the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Since late July 1950, on the 
orders of J. Edgar Hoover, FBI agents had confiscated Robeson’s passport. “I am 
an American. From my window I gaze out upon a scene that reminds me how 
deep-going are the roots of my people in this land,” Paul Robeson wrote in 1957.22 
In 1958, the US Supreme Court ruled against such seizures, and Robeson was 
finally able to travel outside of the United States. He had standing invitations to 
India, Uganda, and Britain. It was in London that he would reiterate that he was 
an American.
The logic of exclusion that placed Black Americans as outside of citizenship, 
as outside of the nation itself, took decades of struggle to dismantle in claims to 
legal and civil rights in the United States. Yet, their claim of belonging is certainly 
an incomplete project, and it remains a key imaginary in the political present 
of Black Lives Matter. There is little hope that the declaration of “I am Indian” 
can portend a better future for Muslims in India. In its stead, the dominance of 
political platforms built on Muslim hate, anti-Muslim grievance politics, revenge 
fantasies, misogyny, and violence will continue unabated and unchecked by legal 
and media forums. There is no widespread will in India to stand in solidarity with 
its Mussalmans, who are simply told to “leave” for Pakistan. 
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It is thus necessary to quarantine India’s COVID-19 problem as one of 
epidemiology and public health alone, and to instead focus on the comorbidity 
that allows for Hindu majoritarian ideologies and institutions to cast the 
Mussalmani as a virus for now well over a hundred years. Anti-Muslim violence is 
the pandemic we refuse to bear witness to, despite evidence and visual documents 
that attest to its extraordinary virulence. The accusation can easily be turned 
as a symptomatic description with one difference. Where the virus pits human 
breath against human breath, it could be imagined as a leveler or an equalizer. 
Everyone can get COVID-19. Even in a dark way, the novel coronavirus could be 
a demonstration of our innate sameness as a species. 
Yet, the Mussalmani virus shows that the bodies of two Indians are not the 
same. They do not live or die the same way. Just as we can see from the case of the 
United States, all human beings cannot breathe in the same way, with the same 
freedom. Some people have no authority over their own breathing. We know from 
the cry of “I Can’t Breathe,” from the time Eric Garner uttered it eleven times in July 
2014 before his death to George Floyd desperately saying it again and again. In the 
now countless videos of the lynching of Muslims, we know they cannot breathe—
surrounded by mob violence, beaten, dragged—because in the end, they are dead. 
The Mussalmani virus is a virus that excels at showcasing alterity, difference, and 
foreignness. It marks certain bodies for elimination and destruction and makes 
their deaths seem natural, normal, necessary for the health of a nation.
A virus forces us to look to the future, to build models that extrapolate 
outcomes from behavior and rates of transmission. Epidemiology has little interest 
in the past, and if so, it is only to create a way to anticipate and quantify what is to 
come. Yet, what if we were to keep our gaze—the historian’s gaze—on the past of 
the subcontinent to ask anew about our political present? Historians have, in the 
face of rising Hindu majoritarianism, traced the construction of this otherness 
between Muslims and Hindus to the colonial period or to the wars and conflicts 
of the medieval world. Some have even traced it back to the originary moments of 
Islam. All of these deep studies of the past are important, and they tell us that the 
present is not the only way to live and die, that there were once other ways of being 
and other projects of world-making that were not built on the violent exclusion 
and erasure of minorities. Yet, as we see today, too often the past is not how anyone 
studies viruses that ravage the present. 
To fully document the novelty of the novel coronavirus, we need to build a 
model of the past that accounts for comorbidities, the coexisting deaths, the wearing 
away of the body, that has made our present. In the time of coronavirus, some 
historians are quick to remark on the similarities between the global pandemic of 
2020 and the Great Influenza Epidemic of 1918.23 The popular press has certainly 
found it a useful comparison, as both events sit at the opening of a yawning century 
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and concern a respiratory disease that has afflicted the world over. 
However, if we step away from looking at the past solely through the lens of 
COVID-19 and instead look for analogues to the Mussalmani virus, a different 
history becomes significant for the purpose of modeling out possible futures.
A future for India would be the deep past of the “Black Death” plague of 
fourteenth-century Europe. Nestled between the traffic of crusading armies, the 
Black Death arrived in Europe between 1348 and 1350. As the plague spread, 
rumors of Jews being carriers of the plague, of poisoning wells, spread across small 
towns and communities. Understanding the Jews to be the carriers and the cause, 
across Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, between 1348 and 
1351, hundreds of Jews were burned, drowned, and driven out.24 A century later, 
the Jews of Europe were still living under the terror of blood libel—depicted by 
Christians as having eaten the flesh of Christian children and of Christ, of poisoning 
wells, and of forcibly converting Christians.25 In Germany, the memory of such 
horrendously imagined crimes by Jews was literally etched into the frescoes of 
churches and retold in chronicles and stories. These violent imaginaries persisted 
for 600 years, such that the very same localities where anti-Jewish pogroms had 
taken place in the fourteenth century gave rise to the Nationalist Socialist party in 
the early twentieth century.26
The blood libel against Jews—neighbors born and raised alongside Christians, 
people who spoke the same language, who ate, dressed, lived, and worked in 
the same communities—made them into demons to be hunted and killed. They 
were expelled as a matter of state politics.27 The cultural products of Europe, the 
sacral works, the topologies of the cities, the arrangement of music, all worked 
seamlessly to make Jews a target for hate, marking their existence for elimination. 
This was done by the learned and the political, the lay and the noble. Where the 
figure of the enslaved African gave to Europe the central logic of domination 
and dehumanization, the Jew was the foundation of a politics of state-sponsored 
elimination.
That anti-Semitism would shape the history of Europe has been clear and 
significantly understood since the Holocaust carried out by the Nationalist 
Socialists in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, the effects of Islamophobia, 
specifically leading up to and since 1992, on the body politic of India, have not 
been recognized. Starting with the destruction of the Babri mosque as a globally 
organized, media-savvy program for political mobilization, Hindu-Muslim 
relations in India are framed as “communal affairs.” Yet, there is no such parity as 
the intervening hyphen would suggest. Muslims are a mere 13 percent of India’s 
population of 1.3 billion. The Sachar Committee Report in 2006 found them to 
have far lower literacy rates and economic status than the “Hindu” population, 
including the Scheduled and Restricted Castes.28
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Let us be clear that Muslims in India are a marginalized community, largely 
poor, without access to political or social mobility, and a group that is demonized 
across the cultural and political spheres. The short history of seventy-plus years 
in the Republic of India may only have a few pogroms and riots, but the long 
future ahead for the subcontinent appears to aspire toward a politics of complete 
elimination and expulsion. The Muslims of India do not have an ally in the 
vaunted Constitution, which is the prime vehicle of their dispossession in Assam 
and in Kashmir. The Muslims of India cannot find safety in the courts, for the 
Supreme Court is the instrument of their marginalization. The Muslims of India 
cannot claim any solace from an idea of a “secular India,” for the one may never 
have existed, and it certainly does not exist in the current democracy. If “there is 
little doubt that,” as Partha Chatterjee writes, “irrespective of election results, the 
pedagogy of Hindutva will continue to claim that a strong and unified nation-state 
must rest on the support of a unitary and homogenous people-nation,” then the 
Mussalman will forever be labeled as a foreign virus in the degenerating body-
politic of India.29 Leave aside 600 years, this increasingly dangerous Hindutva 
virulence works constantly and consistently to erase Muslim identity and Muslim 
pasts at an alarming rate. Without a collective reckoning with majoritarian pasts 
and the present rise in anti-Muslim violence, it will reduce Muslim futures in 
India to nothing in mere decades. This virulence ravages mosques and courts to 
leave the rubble of tolerant India behind, it makes the promise of the Constitution 
little more than a joke for those subject to the nonsovereignty of borderlands, 
and it spreads in the form of WhatsApp rumors and seemingly endless videos of 
innocent men, lynched. This virulence has no vaccine.
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